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Abstract
Background: In Germany, surveillance for infectious disease outbreaks is integrated into an electronic surveillance system.
For 2007, the national surveillance database contains case-based information on 201,224 norovirus cases, three-quarters of
which are linked to outbreaks. We evaluated the data quality of the national database in reflecting nosocomial norovirus
outbreak (NNO) data available in 19 Hessian local public health authorities (LPHAs) and the influence of differences between
LPHA’s follow-up procedures for laboratory notifications of Norovirus positive stool samples on outbreak under-
ascertainment.
Methods: Data on NNO beginning in 2007 and notified to the 19 LPHAs were extracted from the national database,
investigated regarding internal validity and compared to data collected from LPHAs for a study on NNO control. LPHAs were
questioned whether they routinely contacted all persons for whom a laboratory diagnosis of norovirus infection was
notified. The number of outbreaks per 1,000 hospital beds and the number of cases within NNOs for acute care and
rehabilitation hospitals were compared between counties with and without complete follow-up.
Results: The national database contained information on 155 NNOs, including 3,115 cases. Cases were missed in the
national database in 58 (37%) of the outbreaks. Information on hospitalisation was incorrect for an estimated 47% of NNO
cases. Information on county of infection was incorrect for 24% (199/820) of cases being forwarded between LPHAs for data
entry. Reported NNO incidence and number of NNO cases in acute care hospitals was higher in counties with complete
follow-up (incidence-rate ratio (IRR) 2.7, 95% CI 1.4–5.7, p-value 0.002 and IRR 2.1, 95% CI 1.9–2.4, p-value 0.001,
respectively).
Conclusions: Many NNOs are not notified by hospitals and differences in LPHA procedures have an impact on the number
of outbreaks captured in the surveillance system. Forwarding of case-by-case data on Norovirus outbreak cases from the
local to the state and national level should not be required.
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Introduction
In 2001, the Protection against Infection Act (Infektionsschutz-
gesetz: IfSG) standardised the German surveillance system for
notifiablediseases[1].Asaresult,thenationalpublichealth institute
in Germany, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), implemented an
electronic surveillance system for infectious disease outbreaks in
Germany integratedin the case-based electronic surveillancesystem
SurvNet@RKI [2,3]. Electronic surveillance has become a
necessity and many national surveillance systems now rely on or
are moving towards electronic reporting systems [4,5,6].
With the advent of the IfSG, laboratories have to notify all cases
with norovirus positive stool samples to local public health
authorities (LPHAs) and physicians have to notify gastroenteritis
outbreaks and hospitals nosocomial outbreaks to LPHAs [1].
Illness due to Norovirus infection is generally mild, characterized
by acute vomiting and diarrhea, but may be severe and life
threatening in risk groups such as elderly and immunocompro-
mised patients [7,8]. Outbreaks occur in people of all ages and are
particularly common in health care settings and residential homes
[9]. In Germany, LPHAS use Norovirus notifications to discuss
control measures, e.g. with hospitals and to investigate outbreaks.
At the local, state and national level reported data are used to
describe the epidemiology of norovirus infections. Since 2004,
norovirus gastroenteritis has become the most frequently reported
disease in Germany [10]. In 2007, 46% (201,224/438,356) of all
cases registered in the national database were norovirus cases.
Approximately three quarters (74%) of these cases were part of
outbreaks [11]. Most outbreaks occurred in hospitals (39%),
nursing homes (38%), and day care centres (14%).
Public health surveillance systems should be evaluated period-
ically to ensure that problems of public health importance are
being monitored efficiently and effectively [12]. Many published
evaluations have focused on timeliness [13] and completeness of
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disease or measles. Attention to data quality and representative-
ness of surveillance systems has been described as insufficient [16].
With the advent of electronic reporting, there is a general
temptation to increase the amount of data requested for every
case. For example the IfSG requires LPHAs to report case-based
information on hospitalisation, fatalities and place of infection [1].
However data on the validity, acceptability and usefulness of this
additional reporting of case-based data are still scarce. Further-
more, electronic processing in the current German surveillance
system is limited to the transmission of digitized information from
the local, to a state and the national level. This implies that the
work-load for LPHAs for the collection and manual input of
detailed case-based data into the surveillance system may be
considerable for diseases with a high reporting incidence. This
evaluation examined the accuracy with which the national
database reflects nosocomial norovirus outbreak (NNO) data
available at LPHAs. Aspects evaluated include: completeness of
case-reports, i.e. the amount of cases captured in the national
database as an indication of outbreak size, and completeness and
validity of data on county of infection and hospitalisation of cases.
Working-time required at state level to link outbreak cases was
documented.
Undernotification is a well known characteristic of mandatory
surveillance systems [14–17]. Many LPHAs consider that
nosocomial outbreaks are less frequently notified in comparison
to laboratory notifications of norovirus positive stool samples. To
identify additional not yet notified norovirus outbreaks several
Hessian LPHAs strive to contact all persons for whom a laboratory
diagnosis of norovirus infection is notified while others limit their
follow-up to laboratory notifications suggesting an institutional
setting. However, the influence of LPHAs’ following-up of
laboratory notifications of norovirus positive stool samples on the
number of NNOs ascertained and associated cases has not been
investigated previously.
Reporting procedure
LPHAs use either SurvNet@RKI or one of five commercially
offered disease-reporting software systems for the management
and transmission of case-based datasets to the state level. The data
collected for norovirus cases in this system include demographic
characteristics, time of symptom onset and/or diagnosis, hospital-
isation, fatalities, presumed place of infection, diagnostics, case
definition criteria, association with outbreaks and administrative
data. In total, a minimum of 14 items should be entered into the
database for each norovirus case. At least once a week the LPHAs
are required to enter into the software system newly notified cases
fulfilling the national case definition criteria and to create a
transport file for the state level (figure 1). Cases are required to be
entered into the peripheral database by the LPHA responsible for
the county of residence of a case. This implies that LPHAs which
investigate a nosocomial norovirus outbreak have to forward
information on cases residing outside their counties to the LPHAs
where the cases reside, which then enter the case-based data into
their databases. State public health authorities (SPHAs) use
SurvNet@RKI to store, analyse and forward datasets to the
national level at RKI. LPHAs, SPHAs and the RKI can manually
link single case records together thereby creating an outbreak
report as a new database entity [3]. For this purpose a unique
outbreak identification number (OIN), assigned by the LPHA
Figure 1. Data flow for the surveillance of nosocomial norovirus outbreaks from hospitals to the national level and – for the
evaluation – to the Hessian SPHA, Germany, 2007.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017341.g001
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For a case residing outside the county the LPHA investigating the
outbreak is responsible for, the OIN has to be forwarded to the
LPHA the case resides together with the required case-based
information. Linking of cases at local, state and national level is
essential to correctly analyse the national database for number and
size of outbreaks.
Methods
Data on NNO beginning in 2007 and notified to 19 of the 25
Hessian LPHAs were extracted from the national database and
investigated regarding validity for information on hospitalisation
and county of infection. To evaluate the extent to which
information on outbreak size available at the LPHAs can be
retrieved in the national database, data obtained by these 19
LPHAs during a prospective study on measures taken to control
nosocomial norovirus outbreaks, the NNO control study [18],
were used.
Data sources
1) For the NNO control study, 19 of 25 LPHAs prospectively
filled in a questionnaire for all outbreaks beginning in 2007 and
sent it to the Hessian SPHA at the end of the outbreak (figure 1).
Data used from this questionnaire included the OIN and the
outbreak size, provided as the number of ill patients and number
of ill staff, and is further referred to as the NNO control study
dataset.
2) From the national database data on Hessian NNO which
began in 2007 were extracted using the following algorithm: First,
a list of all Hessian norovirus cases notified in 2007 was used to
create a list of all Hessian norovirus outbreaks. Second, all cases
which were part of the outbreaks of the Hessian norovirus
outbreaks list were extracted from the national database. The
second list also contained cases resident outside Hesse and/or
notified in 2008. For each single case, information on the setting of
the outbreak (e.g. hospital, household, day-care), hospitalisation,
place of infection, OIN and the LPHA entering the case into the
peripheral database was extracted. Data were extracted from the
national database as of 1 July 2008. This dataset was restricted to
contain only information on cases whose OIN was included in the
NNO control study and is further referred to as the surveillance
dataset.
For the excluded cases, information on the setting of the
outbreak (e.g. hospital) was used to check for NNO missed in the
NNO control study, but none was found. The NNO control study
dataset was used to evaluate the national surveillance database
regarding internal consistency for information on hospitalisation
and place of infection. To evaluate information on outbreak size,
the surveillance dataset and the NNO control study dataset were
linked based on the OIN. Reasons for differences in outbreak size
between the two datasets were determined in collaboration
between the 19 LPHAs and the Hessian SPHA. Stata version
10.0H (StataCorp., College Station, TX, USA) was used for data
management and analysis.
For this evaluation only data required for mandatory surveil-
lance were used. Hence, no ethical approval was obtained.
Definitions and assumptions
Case definition. The national case definition for norovirus
gastroenteritis requires a laboratory confirmation of norovirus
infection or symptomatic disease (vomiting or diarrhoea) in a
person with an epidemiological link to a laboratory confirmed case
[19]. Outbreaks contain $2 cases [11].
Place of infection. For the national surveillance system,
place of infection is defined as the German county or any country
other than Germany where the LPHA assumed the case acquired
the infection. In case of an uncertain place of infection, two or
more counties or countries may be entered into the surveillance
database. Therefore, by definition, the place of infection for NNO
cases is the county where the hospital is located.
Hospitalisation. For a notified case to be reported as
hospitalised, the national surveillance system does not require a
causal link between the notified disease and hospitalisation.
Therefore, by definition, for NNOs all patients are to be
reported as hospitalised. Hospitalisation of hospital staff for
norovirus infection is very unlikely and hospital staff infected
during NNOs was assumed to be correctly reported as ‘‘not
hospitalised’’.
Follow-up of norovirus laboratory notifications by the 19
Hessian LPHAs
To quantify the influence of the different follow-up procedures
on the number of nosocomial norovirus outbreaks and cases
captured in the surveillance system the 19 LPHAs were questioned
regarding their follow-up procedures and then grouped based on
whether they routinely contact all persons for whom a laboratory
diagnosis of norovirus infection is notified (complete follow-up) or
whether follow-up of laboratory notifications is limited to
notifications suggesting an institutional setting (incomplete fol-
low-up). For both groups of LPHAs, the number of hospital beds,
the number of outbreaks per 1,000 hospital beds per year and the
number of cases within NNOs for acute care and rehabilitation
hospitals were calculated. The two groups of LPHAs were
compared by calculating incidence-rate ratios (IRRs), 95%
confidence intervals (95% CIs), and attributable fractions among
the exposed and population attributable fractions [20]. Differences
in outbreak sizes between the two groups were tested using the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Time requirements to link outbreak-related cases at the
Hessian state level
As part of the routine surveillance activities the SurvNet@RKI
database at the Hessian SPHA was checked weekly for new or
updated outbreak associated norovirus cases and outbreak cases
linked to outbreak reports. In 2007, working-time required to
check reported norovirus cases and link outbreak associated cases
was prospectively documented. This included comparing OIN of
newly received norovirus cases to previously received cases and, if
applicable, combining them in the dataset to outbreak reports.
The time required for Norovirus cases reported from all 25
Hessian counties was documented, as in practice it was not
possible to separately determine working-time by county or
outbreak. Time required for further aspects of the surveillance
system e.g. for the collection, analysis and dissemination of data, or
time required for feed-back to LPHAs of missing or erroneous
information on OINs or outbreak setting, was not included. Nor
could we document the time requirements at the local level.
Population under surveillance in counties included in the
evaluation
The evaluation was conducted for 19 counties in Hesse,
Germany, with a total population of 4.2 million inhabitants.
These were the 19 counties who’s LPHAs agreed to participate in
the NNO study. 114 acute care and 45 rehabilitation hospitals
operate in these 19 counties, providing 20,160 and 8,723 beds,
respectively. The time required to link outbreak-related cases at
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(6.1 million inhabitants). Population data and number of
hospital beds by county were provided by the Hesse Statistical
Office, Germany (Hessisches Statistisches Landesamt, Wiesbaden,
Germany).
Results
Outbreak size
Information on 155 NNOs that began in 2007 was obtained
through the national surveillance system and the NNO control
study. However, for these 155 outbreaks, the surveillance dataset
contained 3,115 cases and the NNO control study dataset 3,381
cases. For 86 (55%) of these outbreaks, outbreak size did not differ
between the two datasets. For 58 (37%) outbreaks, the surveillance
dataset contained fewer cases, and for 11 (7%) outbreaks the
surveillance dataset contained more cases. For 65 (94%) of the 69
outbreaks with discrepant information on outbreak size, the
differences could be clarified (table 1).
Place of infection
In the surveillance dataset, information on the place of infection
was available for 99.3% (3,094/3,115) of the Hessian NNO cases.
Eight-hundred-thirty (27%) of the 3,315 cases were forwarded
from the LPHA managing the outbreak to the LPHA responsible
for the county of residence of a case. For 820 of these cases, one
place of infection was reported. For 199 (24%) of the 820 cases, the
place of infection reported was different from the outbreak county
and mostly corresponded to the county of the LPHA entering the
data.
Hospitalisation
In the surveillance dataset, information on whether cases were
hospitalised was available for 99.7% (3,105/3,115) of NNO cases.
Thirty-four percent (1,052/3,105) of these cases were reported as
hospitalised. In the NNO control study dataset, 81% (2,721) of
persons affected were patients, and the remainder were staff
members. Therefore, for an estimated 47% of Hessian NNO
cases, information on hospitalisation was incorrect in the
surveillance dataset.
Follow-up of notifications by LPHAs
Fifteen of the 19 LPHAs routinely contacted all persons for
whom a laboratory diagnosis of norovirus infection was notified.
Number of outbreaks, number of hospital beds and number of
outbreaks per 100 hospital beds for counties with and without
complete follow-up are presented in table 2. Reported NNO
incidence in acute care hospitals was higher in counties with
complete follow-up of laboratory notifications than in counties
with incomplete follow-up (IRR 2.7, 95% CI 1.4–5.7, p-value
=0.002). For NNO in rehabilitation clinics this difference was
small and did not reach statistical significance (IRR 1.4, 95% CI
0.4–8.0, p-value =0.6). Also, counties with complete follow-up of
laboratory notifications reported in total more NNO-cases for
acute care hospitals (IRR 2.1, 95% CI 1.9–2.4, p-value =0.001),
but not for rehabilitation clinics (IRR 0.9, 95% CI 0.7–1.2, p-
value =0.4). For acute care hospitals, we obtained an attributable
fraction among the exposed of 63%, i.e. for counties with complete
follow-up 63% of outbreaks in acute care hospitals were identified
because LPHAS following-up all laboratory notifications instead of
following-up only those suggesting an institutional setting. The
population attributable fraction, i.e. the net proportion of all
outbreaks known to the 19 LPHAs being identified because of 14
LPHAs completely following-up all laboratory notifications instead
of following-up only laboratory notifications suggesting an
institutional setting, was 59%. The 13 outbreaks in counties with
incomplete follow-up were nearly twice as large as the 142
outbreaks in counties with complete follow-up (median 21 and 11
cases, respectively) (p-value =0.08).
Time requirements to link norovirus cases at the Hessian
state level
For 2007, the surveillance database SurvNet@RKI contained
12,115 norovirus cases reported in Hesse. At the Hessian state
level, working-time to link norovirus cases reported in 2007 was
151 hours.
Discussion
In Europe, rates of ascertained viral gastroenteritis outbreaks
differ markedly, suggesting incomplete ascertainment for most
countries [9]. In our evaluation, LPHA with complete follow-up of
Table 1. Differences in outbreak size between the two datasets, nosocomial norovirus outbreaks, Hesse, Germany, 2007.
Reasons for differences in outbreak size Number of outbreaks Total number of cases
More cases in the surveillance dataset (Number of outbreaks=11)
LPHA included cases of a linked nursing home in hospital outbreak 1 22
No explanation 31 9
LPHA responsible for outbreak not informed on additional cases identified by 2
nd LPHA 2 13
LPHA miscounted cases on line list when filling out the questionnaire
for the NNO control study
38
Cases assigned mistakenly to outbreak 2 2
Less cases in the surveillance dataset (N=58)
County of residence different from county of outbreak 53 367
only aggregated numbers reported to LPHA 1 21
No explanation 18
LPHA missed cases when entering data into the local database 1 2
LPHA miscounted cases on line list when filling out the questionnaire
for the NNO control study
22
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017341.t001
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outbreaks and more outbreak associated cases than LPHAs who
only contacted cases whose notifications suggested an institu-
tional setting, i.e. a hospital laboratory. Calculation of the
population attributable risk percent indicated that more than
half of NNOs were identified because a part of the Hessian
LPHAs followed-up all laboratory notifications, irrespective of
their chance to find an outbreak. This calculation did not
measure the total contribution of follow-up of laboratory
notifications. Even LPHAs with incomplete follow-up identified
NNO based on laboratory notifications. Our evaluation confirms
previous, anecdotal reports of NNO being underreported in
Germany and the contribution of LPHAs for ascertainment of
NNO by actively searching for outbreaks. The tendency towards
a higher median outbreak size in counties with incomplete
follow-up also suggests a differential notification of outbreaks by
size. Previously it had been hypothesized that surveillance
databases for Norovirus outbreaks preferentially include larger
outbreaks, as outbreaks are not reported until they reach a
certain size [21].
The use of a second dataset – the NNO control study dataset –
suggests that all NNOs known at Hessian LPHAs could be
retrieved from the national surveillance database. Forwarding of
outbreak cases by the LPHA managing the outbreak to the LPHAs
responsible for the cases’ counties of residence was the major
factor explaining the missing of notified cases in the surveillance
dataset. For the 155 NNOs contained in the surveillance dataset
(including 3,115 cases), 367 cases were missed for this reason,
indicating that mean estimates of outbreak size would be biased by
2.4 cases per outbreak. For these missed cases we were unable to
assess if they had not been entered into the surveillance system or if
they had been entered without OIN enabling us to identify cases as
outbreak-associated cases and to link them.
More than one quarter of all ascertained cases in NNOs needed
to be forwarded to the LPHA responsible for the cases’ counties of
residence. Forwarding of case-based information to a second
LPHA for data entry implies additional work: 1) for the hospital to
provide LPHAs with address details of cases, 2) for LPHAs to
forward case-based information and 3) for state and national
institutes to link reported cases. In our evaluation, only resources
required to link cases at the Hessian state level were quantified.
Under the assumption of these time requirements depending
exclusively on population size, extrapolating the Hessian SPHA
time requirements to all 16 German SPHAs (responsible for 82
million inhabitants), time requirements for 2007 would have
amounted to 254 eight-hour working days. In our view, this effort
is far too huge to be justified.
The purpose of forwarding case-based information to the LPHA
responsible for the cases’ county of residence is to allow the LPHA
to conduct further infection control investigations and prompt
appropriate measures, such as at home or in the cases’ workplace.
However, for many nosocomial norovirus cases, no further
infection control investigations or measures are required in the
county of residence of the case and forwarding of the information
does not lead to any infection control action by the LPHA
receiving it. We therefore believe that the LPHA managing an
institutional outbreak should enter directly all outbreak-related
data into the surveillance system.
Besides the linking of norovirus cases at state level, additional
factors influence reported NNO sizes: hospitals test different
numbers of symptomatic patients for norovirus, tests used for
norovirus diagnosis have different sensitivities and specificities
[22], and distinguishing between (ongoing) transmission and
repeated norovirus introduction into a hospital is difficult [23].
We therefore think that for mandatory surveillance, current efforts
to produce ‘‘accurate’’ data on NNO sizes by linking of cases are
disproportionate.
Completeness of data on hospitalisation and county of infection
was high (over 99%). For county of infection, all software
programs provide a default answer selection, corresponding to
the county the LPHA is responsible for. This pre-selection explains
the high completeness for this variable, but also the high
proportion of incorrect entries (24%) when the pre-selection
should have been changed. For the variable hospitalisation, no
pre-selection is possible and the high proportion of incorrect
entries (47%) is a result of LPHAs’ misconception of the variable’s
meaning: when the results of this evaluation were fed-back to
LPHAs’ staff, many of them reported to require a causal
association, i.e. hospitalisation for norovirus infection, thus
erroneously not reporting cases who acquired their infection
during hospitalisation as hospitalised. The high proportion of
incorrect data entries 1) generally questions the validity of the
current surveillance data regarding the proportion of notified
(norovirus) cases being hospitalised and 2) suggests reconsidering
the surveillance definition of hospitalisation (e.g. into ‘‘yes, due to
norovirus infection’’; ‘‘yes, due to other causes’’; ‘‘no’’) and 3)
underlines the need for data quality efforts to obtain useful case-
based information from routine surveillance.
Norovirus-Infections are not on the list of priority diseases for
surveillance in the European Union [24] and large differences in
the surveillance systems for Norovirus-infections exist. E.G.
France, Denmark, and Sweden report only suspected food-borne
Norovirus outbreaks, Italy and Spain do not have a national
Norovirus surveillance system [25], and in Austria all viral
Table 2. Number of outbreaks, number of hospital beds and number of outbreaks per 100 hospital beds for counties with and
without complete follow-up of laboratory notifications, Hesse, Germany, 2007.
Completeness
of follow-up
Number of
outbreaks
Number of
hospital beds
Incidence Rate
(Number of outbreaks
per 100 hospital beds)
Incidence Rate
Ratio (95% CI)
Acute care hospitals
Complete 131 16,725 7.8 2.7 (1.4–5.7)
Incomplete 10 3,435 2.9 Ref.
Rehabilitation hospitals
Complete 11 6,281 1.8 1.4 (0.4–8.0)
Incomplete 3 2,442 1.3 Ref.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017341.t002
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numbers of Norovirus outbreaks for Germany are very high when
compared to other European countries [9,25]. In Florida (.18
million inhabitants) only 7 out of 257 reported Norovirus
outbreaks during a 1-year study affected hospitals [27]. To our
knowledge, the German surveillance system is unique in
combining a huge number of Norovirus outbreak reports with
the availability of case-based information for all cases, whether
outbreak associated or not, at the national level.
In addition to collecting case-based information on huge
numbers of Norovirus cases, the work required to provide this
information for all outbreak cases for the state and national level is
increased by the current procedure of data entry of Norovirus
cases belonging to one outbreak in several LPHAs and linking the
information at state and national level. Furthermore, the
extraction of setting-specific outbreak data of the national
surveillance database is intricate [11], and the national database
contains high numbers of incorrect entries (e.g. on hospitalisation
of Norovirus cases). We believe that at state and national level
aggregated data, including a limited number of variables per
outbreak (e.g. date of onset of first and last case, number of cases,
outbreak setting, foodborne origin), would provide sufficient
information to describe the epidemiology of norovirus outbreaks.
It has been previously suggested that for diseases with a high
incidence and low severity case-by-case reporting should not be
required at the national level [28]. At the local level complete
follow- up of laboratory notifications allowed LPHAs to identify
NNOs and to discuss control measures with hospitals.
For the 2009–2010 norovirus season the RKI changed the
reporting requirements for LPHAs in order to reduce their
workload. While reporting requirements of laboratory confirmed
Norovirus cases remained unchanged, non laboratory-confirmed,
outbreak-associated cases could be reported in an aggregated form
[29]. Beginning in 2011, LPHAs have to report only laboratory
confirmed Norovirus cases [30]. Further changes of the system,
e.g. the forwarding of case-based information from the LPHA
managing the outbreak to the LPHA responsible for the cases
county of residence, will require a change in the German
Protection against Infection Act (IfSG). In our view further work
is needed to find a better balance between data requirements for
descriptive epidemiology, required resources and data quality
issues for the surveillance of NNOs.
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